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1Skill formation and economic development
Central to the wealth of nations are the development and utilization of the skills of
people.  Skills enable people to make technologies and organizations function to
produce goods and services.  Skills can also be used to generate technological and
organizational innovations that produce goods and services that are higher quality
and/or lower cost than were previously possible.  These innovations often devalue
some traditional skills, but also create demand for new combinations of existing
skills or entirely new skills.
The process of skill formation is continuous, cumulative, and collective.  It is
continuous because skills that are not utilized will deteriorate, thus losing their value
as productive assets.  It is cumulative because the development of new skills builds
on a base of existing skills.  It is collective because, as the process of skill formation
becomes more continuous and cumulative, it becomes necessary to plan and
coordinate the development and utilization of specialized skills through integrated
organizations.
Over time, continuity, cumulativity, and collectivity make the process of skill
formation ever more complex.  To transform investments in skills into competitive
advantage, enterprises, regions, and nations must plan and coordinate the skill-
formation process.  To attain and sustain a high level of wealth, enterprises,
industries, regions, and nations must have both strategies for skill formation and
structures to implement these strategies.  To generate competitive advantage on the
basis of investments in physical and human capital, a strategy and structure of skill
formation must create value -- products that people want at costs they are willing to
bear.
Continuity, cumulativity, and collectivity make skill formation a political process
that varies across nations and over time.  Skill formation requires investments in the
productive capabilities of people, and different societies have different strategies
concerning the allocation of these investments across the population.  We shall argue
that strategic differences in national systems of skill formation reflect structural
differences in the social organization of nations, including the social organization
of business enterprises that form the core of national economies.  We shall also argue
that an understanding of skill formation as both an investment process and a learning
process is essential to understanding changes in the competitive advantage of nations
and enterprises.
This paper provides a general analysis, based on a synthesis of considerable
empirical evidence, of the causes and consequences of differences in the process of
skill formation in four wealthy nations -- Japan, United States, Germany, and Britain
-- in the post-World War II decades.  First, we provide a general perspective on the
strategy and structure of skill formation in major industrial enterprises in each of
these nations during the past few decades.  Then we look at the historical evolution
of the skill-formation systems in these four nations to gain insights into the problems
and possibilities of restructuring a previously successful skill-formation system when
it no longer yields competitive advantage.  Finally, we outline the implications of the
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comparative analysis of systems of skill formation for understanding changes in
international competitive advantage.
3The strategy and structure of skill formation
1. Strategy and structure
For any individual, skill formation occurs through some combination of training and
experience.  To set the skill-formation process in motion, someone has to decide that
it is worth investing in skills.  In some cases and for certain types of skill, this
strategic decision is made by the individual in whom the skills will reside.  In other
cases and for other types of skills, however, the strategic decision to invest in skills
can be made by those who control the resources of an organization -- a government,
a trade association, an enterprise -- that has an interest in the skill-formation process.
As a general rule, the more complex (continuous, cumulative, and collective) the
skill-formation process, the more will the decision to invest in skills have to be
undertaken by an organization rather than an individual.  Complexity increases the
need for planning, coordinating, and sustaining the skill-formation process across
people and over time.  Thus, the costs entailed in skill formation transcend the
financial capabilities of individuals involved in the specialized division of labor.  The
extent of the financial commitment required for skill formation for modern industry
demands a collectivization of financial resources.
The complexity of the skill-formation process also demands that the strategic
decision makers who allocate financial resources to investment in human and
physical capital have a strategy for putting in place the technological and
organizational structure of the skill-formation process that will be required to achieve
desired goals.  This strategy will entail investing in certain types of skills, in certain
types of people who will possess these skills, and in certain types of relationships
among people who will have to develop and utilize their skills collectively.
The most successful industrial economies have relied heavily, although by no means
exclusively, on private-sector business enterprises to plan the strategy and implement
the structure that results in skill formation.  A common organizational characteristic
of these business enterprises is the distinction between management and labor.  An
extreme view of this distinction, shaped by largely erroneous views of the centrality
of Marxian exploitation and Tayloristic rationalization to advanced capitalist
development, is that managers think (conceive) and workers do (execute) [the classic
modern statement of this point of view is Braverman 1974; for an extended critique,
see Lazonick 1990].  The extreme view ignores the importance to the development of
capitalist economies of a) managerial structures, in which over the course of their
careers, employees learn to think by doing a variety of tasks, thus making the
transition from technical specialist to managerial generalist; and b) the integration of
thinking and doing on the shop floor as part of an organizational strategy to develop
and utilize increasingly complex technologies.
The complexity of the learning process requires that all modern enterprises have a
hierarchy in which some people are more involved in thinking and other people are
more involved in doing.  What makes organizational, as distinct from simply
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individual, learning possible, however, is the organizational integration of the
specialized activities of those involved in the learning process.  Organizational
integration in turn requires that everyone in the learning process think about what
they do, and that those further up the hierarchy who plan and coordinate the work of
other specialists think about what these other people do as well.
As our cross-national comparisons of the strategy and structure of skill formation
within enterprises in Japan, United States, Germany, and Britain will show, the
organization structures of business enterprises that generate organizational learning
have evolved over time, with "organizational integration" as the dominant
determinant of long-term changes in competitive advantage.  Organizational
integration is a set of relationships among participants in a specialized division of
labor that permits their activities to be planned and coordinated to achieve common
goals [for an elaboration, see Lazonick and West, forthcoming].  For the business
enterprise engaged in competition for product markets, organizational integration
permits the specialized division of labor to generate higher quality and/or lower cost
products than the enterprise has previously been capable of producing.
Organizational integration provides the capability to learn as an enterprise, and often
as a group of enterprises, and the potential to innovate in market competition.
At the same time, organizational integration is a costly process.  To build the
relationships among participants in the specialized division of labor that are the
social substance of organizational integration requires substantial commitments of
resources over sustained periods of time.  The high fixed costs of building these
relationships will place the enterprise at a competitive disadvantage until such time
as the learning process, generated by these relationships, yields returns.  The
prospects of returns, moreover, are always highly uncertain, in part because the
expected learning may not occur and in part because even when it does occur this
learning may not be sufficient to meet the challenge of more innovative competitors
[see Lazonick 1991:chs.3,6].  The building of the relationships that constitute
organizational integration must, therefore, be strategic -- investments in
organizationally integrated structures must ultimately generate the high-quality
and/or low-cost products that make these investments economically worthwhile.
Otherwise these investments will result in competitive disadvantage rather than
competitive advantage [see Lazonick 1991:ch.3].
In the cross-national comparisons of skill formation, we shall start with the case of
Japan.  The current Japanese system of skill formation is the most powerful that the
world has yet seen.  As such, it is a benchmark against which to evaluate the skill-
formation systems in other industrial economies -- even in economies such as those
of United States, Germany, and Britain that have in some industries and in certain
periods been world industrial leaders.
Next we compare the Japanese system of skill formation with that of the United
States, the national economy whose prior industrial leadership has thus far been most
challenged by the Japanese.  An understanding of the role of organizational
integration within managerial structures of major American enterprises in U.S.
industrial development permits us to comprehend the Japanese challenge as a more
organizationally integrated elaboration of the previously successful American model.
The potency of the Japanese competitive challenge resides in the ability of Japanese
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enterprises to transform themselves from low-cost producers for low-quality markets
to low-cost producers for high-quality markets, thus enabling them to challenge the
world’s most advanced industrial enterprises for market share.
Up until recently, Germany has been less vulnerable to the Japanese challenge than
the United States.  Unlike the United States, the competitive strategy of German
enterprises had been to produce for high-quality markets in which cost competition
has not been paramount and for which the Japanese had not yet learned to compete.
As Japanese enterprises have learned how to produce high-quality, low-cost
products, Germany’s high-quality, but high-cost, strategy has become vulnerable [see
Herrigel and Sabel 1994].  The issue now is whether German enterprises can effect
the organizational transformations necessary to make the transition from high-
quality, high-cost to high-quality, low-cost production.
If the organizational integration of Japanese enterprises is a competitive benchmark
for American and German enterprises today, the organizational integration of
American and German enterprise was a competitive benchmark for British
enterprises many decades ago [see Elbaum and Lazonick 1986].  Both the United
States and Germany underwent managerial revolutions that Britain failed to emulate
[Chandler 1990].  Lacking a strategy and structure of skill formation that could
generate high levels of organizational learning and productivity, British enterprises
and the British economy as a whole engaged in a century of relative economic
decline.  As a European nation with a low-wage but educated, labor force, Britain has
provided a base for Japanese investment that can generate high-quality, low-cost
products with easy access to European markets.  More than anything else, it is the
strategy and structure of Japanese enterprises located in Britain that is transforming
the British industrial landscape [see Oliver and Wilkinson 1988].
2. Japan
Until quite recently, the competitive strategy of Japanese industrial enterprises has
been to be the low-cost producer in the markets that they enter.  The Japanese have
not, however, sought to achieve this objective by keeping down the price of labor
and hence standards of living.  Rather (and this strategy goes back to the Meiji period
[see Lazonick and Mass 1994]), they have sought to compete by eliminating waste in
the form of underutilized materials and machines from the production process.  To
do so has required investing in high levels of skill, and leaving considerable initiative
with workers, on the shop floor.
To maintain the flow of work in the production process while pursuing this
competitive strategy of eliminating waste, the Japanese have been compelled to focus
on the quality of materials and machines.  Over time, this attention to quality has
resulted in a process of skill formation that initially allowed the Japanese to take the
lead in low-cost production, and then enabled them to shift progressively into higher
quality market segments.  To do so on a sustained basis, the Japanese have
increasingly invested in basic research in contrast to their prior practice of borrowing
basic science and technology from abroad.  Despite high real wages and a high
exchange rate -- both manifestations of the success of the Japanese strategy over the
past few decades -- Japanese enterprises are now positioned to be the low-cost
producers in many high-quality markets -- luxury automobiles and sophisticated
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machine tools to name two  -- where they are going head-to-head with not only the
Americans but also the Germans.
What is it about the Japanese system of skill formation that enables them to pursue
this low-cost, high-quality strategy?  The answer to this question begins with the
goals and skills of those who make strategic decisions in Japanese industrial
enterprises.  These strategic decision makers are professional managers who have
spent their careers working their way up and around their companies, thus making
the transition from technical specialist to managerial generalist.  Those managers
who make it to the top, where strategic decisions are made, are able to remain in
powerful and prestigious jobs after the normal "retirement" age of 55 to 60 that
applies to other employees, including most middle managers.  By virtue of their own
career strategies, and not by virtue of ownership stakes, these top managers have firm
commitments to the sustained growth of their companies (which are typically part of
larger enterprise groups) and have control over internally generated financial
resources needed to ensure this sustained growth.
Owners have little if any control over Japanese enterprises.  Through cross-
shareholding, businesses own shares in other businesses but neither sell these shares
to reap capital gains nor demand substantial dividends.  In effect, the cross-
shareholding movement (which remained solid in the late 1980s despite
unprecedented speculation in the minority of shares traded on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange) has negated the traditional power of property to dictate the strategy of
Japanese industry.
The career paths of virtually all managers in Japanese industry give them broad
knowledge of the technologies and organizations in which their enterprises are
involved.  Recruited from universities (many of which have special ties with
particular Japanese companies) in which the vocational content of education is
minimal, Japanese managers spend the first ten years of their careers as white-collar
workers rotating among functional departments, geographic locations, as well as
companies that are part of their enterprise groups (keiretsu).  During these ten years,
they are paid seniority wages and collective bonuses, both of which encourage
teamwork.
Fundamental to this process of organizational learning is the institution of permanent
employment, to which the vast majority of male workers in the major enterprises
have access.  Permanent employment provides the highly credible promise of
employment with the company from the termination of one’s formal education to old
age (even if the years after the "retirement" age of 55 or 60 are spent working at
lower pay and with less authority in a satellite enterprise of one’s company).
Permanent employment is not contractual, but is ensured by the existence of
enterprise unions in all the major Japanese corporations.  Membership in these
unions includes not only all male blue-collar workers who are regular (as distinct
from temporary) employees but also all male white-collar workers, most of whom
will, after ten years, join the ranks of management.  This joint membership of white-
collar and blue-collar workers in the enterprise unions is a powerful force for the
integration of management and labor, not only because future managers align their
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interests with labor but also because current managers need the cooperation of future
managers.
Cooperative management-labor relations, moreover, make both groups better off by
enabling high levels of development and utilization of productive resources [see
Lazonick 1990].  Managers have an interest in investing in new technologies and
workers have an interest in supplying high levels of effort in the utilization of these
technologies.  Indeed, a critical component of these investments in new technologies
is investment in the skills of blue-collar workers.  The institution of permanent
employment is both cause and effect of this system of skill formation.  Armed with
substantial skills, moreover, workers can actually participate in not only the
utilization but also the development of new technologies [see Fruin 1992].
Male blue-collar workers acquire substantial skills because, like white-collar
workers, they undergo a system of cross-training through job rotation during the first
ten years of their employment.  Recruited from high schools in which they will have
received the same high-quality public education as white-collar workers, blue-collar
workers have the cognitive foundations for learning a broad array of jobs.  The
central requirement of these jobs is to eliminate waste while maintaining the flow of
work, which in turn requires close monitoring of, and interventions to rectify,
variability in the quality of materials and the operation of machines.  The cross-
training of blue-collar workers is much less demanding than the cross-training of
white-collar workers, but nevertheless manifests that, for the company, the blue-
collar worker is a valuable asset rather than a dispensable commodity.  The multi-
skilled capacities of blue-collar workers enable them not only to shift easily from one
task or product to another and to be retrained as technology and markets change but
also to communicate more easily and effectively with technical specialists in the
managerial structure who themselves carry out a considerable amount of their work
on the shop floor.  The investment in skills throughout the hierarchical structure and
the organizational integration of managers and workers creates a system in which
problem-solving, and hence learning, are the norms even for blue-collar workers
rather than a system, as is typically the American case, in which problem-solving and
learning are the exclusive prerogatives of managers.
In effect, the Japanese skill-formation system uses levels of educational attainment to
segment the male labor force into managers and workers, but then uses permanent
employment, enterprise unions, cross-training, and hierarchical communication to
achieve organizational integration both within and between the managerial structure
and the shop floor.  Included as full-fledged members of this system are males who
are regular employees, which includes almost all males employed directly by the
major Japanese corporations.  As part of the skill-formation process, these
corporations also make extensive investment in skills of employees of satellite
companies that serve as subcontractors within the enterprise group.  "Retired" older
workers often take their accumulated skills to these smaller enterprises.  In addition,
many salaried employees of major corporations forgo the security of their careers
with these companies to set up their own subcontracting firms within the enterprise
group, thus taking with them to the new firms ten or fifteen years of training that was
fully funded by the main company.
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Not integrated into the Japanese system of skill formation are most women, many of
whom work in major corporations after finishing their formal education but soon
drop out of the labor force to bear and raise children.  During the late 1980s,
however, in the presence of a severe shortage of highly educated labor in Japan and
with the help of an Equal Employment Opportunity Law that went into effect in
1986, a large number of university-educated women were hired on permanent-
employment tracks and received substantially more company-funded training than
had previously been the case.  This inclusion of highly educated women into the
skill-formation process, however, has proved vulnerable to the recession of the early
1990s, in which, despite substantial company investments in their skills, these
women are often finding the promise of permanent employment to be more
ephemeral than real [Cannings and Lazonick 1994; New York Times, May 27
1994:5].  The Japanese segment the labor force on the basis of gender, using the
skills of women as supplements to the highly integrated, and increasingly formidable,
system of skill formation among men.
3. United States
If the Japanese competitive strategy has been to be low-cost producers by eliminating
waste in the production process, the American competitive strategy has been to be
low-cost producers by eliminating reliance on shop-floor skills.  At first sight,
therefore, the Japanese system of skill formation, involving as it does heavy
investments in shop-floor skills, is in stark contrast to the American process.  Indeed,
the widely held notions that "Taylorism" and "Fordism" are the characteristic
features of American mass-production methods reflect this point of view.  To look
only at skill formation on the shop-floor, however, misses a key dimension of the
skill-formation process in which, throughout most of the twentieth century, the
American system has had much in common with that of the Japanese.
Within major U.S. industrial enterprises, substantial skill formation occurs within the
management structure.  Future managerial personnel are recruited into American
companies from universities, although often with more directly relevant (that is,
industry-specific) training than in Japan.  American companies recruit many
university graduates to do research and development in corporate laboratories that
maintain close contact with high-level research being carried out in the universities.
Within the enterprise, management development programs rotate lower level
technical specialists through the enterprise’s various functional departments, product
divisions, and geographical locations, thus transforming the most promising
specialists into generalists.  In most companies, managers have the potential to rise to
positions of substantial decision-making power with a select few eventually rising to
the top.
Those who do reach the top positions in U.S. industrial corporations need not be
substantial owners.  A key feature of the managerial revolution that, during the first
half of this century, brought American industry to global industrial leadership, was
the separation of ownership of company shares from control over company resources
[see Lazonick 1992].  Although a market in top managers has emerged in recent
years, strategic decision makers in U.S. industrial corporation typically come from
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within the managerial structure, their career paths transforming them from technical
specialists to managerial generalists as in the Japanese case.
As members of management, these top managers have a basic commitment to invest
in the skills of "salaried" employees, who are following similar career paths in the
management structure, but not in the skills of "hourly" employees, who are viewed as
interchangeable factors of production.  The investments in organizationally
integrated managerial structures, in which technical specialists are routinely
transformed into managerial generalists, has been the foundation of U.S. industrial
success in the twentieth century.  It is within these managerial structures that are
found the technical skills to generate new products and processes and the
organizational skills to achieve the high levels of production and distribution
required for capturing mass markets.
Where the Japanese system of skill formation most clearly outperforms that of the
Americans is on the shop floor.  The Japanese invest in shop-floor skills but the
Americans do not [Lazonick 1990:chs.9-10].  It is lack of skill on the shop floor, and
consequent lack of problem-solving communication between operatives and
engineers, that precludes American companies from emulating the Japanese in
reducing inventories, defects, downtime, and production-development time.
This despite the fact that, in terms of tenure, American shop-floor workers are only
"hourly" in name.  High levels of utilization of expensive machinery requires reliable
workers, while, since the 1940s, union seniority provisions have provided a high
degree of employment security for the most senior workers.  Yet the very real divide
between management and labor in American companies, institutionalized by the
adversarial structure of American unionism and reinforced by the ideology of the
hourly worker, has posed a formidable barrier for U.S. industrial enterprises to
transform their system of skill formation to respond to the Japanese challenge.  As a
result, the Japanese have been able to capture large shares of markets where only two
or three decades ago both the quality and cost advantages of American corporations
seemed invincible.  Now in a growing array of industries, it is the Japanese, not the
Americans, who are the high-quality, low-cost producers.
4. Germany
The competitive strategy of German industrial enterprises has been to be the high-
quality producers in markets that stress product quality rather than product cost.  To
achieve this objective, German enterprises have focused on the systematic
development and utilization of the technical skills of their managers and workers.  In
Germany, private-sector enterprises play a central role in the system of skill
formation but the additional supportive role played by other organizations,
particularly in the provision of vocational training for workers, distinguishes the
German from the British, American and Japanese systems.  Germany has made a
substantial national commitment to worker skill formation through the establishment
of the most comprehensive and complex system of vocational training in the world.
In addition, the Germans have developed a sophisticated network of higher education
in engineering and other technical disciplines which, since its institution in the
nineteenth century, has continued to serve an indispensable function in the skill-
formation process of German managers.
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At the heart of this national process of skill formation is the German system of
apprenticeship, involving a "dual system" of formal vocational education and on-the-
job training.  A full apprenticeship in this dual system entails practical training in a
company for three or four days per week and attendance at a vocational school
(Berufsschule) for the remainder of the work week.  The practical workplace training
provides systematic exposure to the whole range of work situations and problem-
solving tasks in a legally defined and regulated occupation.  At the end of three years
the apprentice is examined on both theoretical and practical competence, and
receives his skilled worker’s certificate (Facharbeiterbrief) [Münch 1982].
Although the initial decisions to invest in this system of skill formation were of
national origin, employers and workers, through their respective associations, exert
substantial influence on the structure of the apprenticeship system.  These
associations play roles in setting public training policy at the national and regional
(or Lander) levels, and in administering and controlling the operation of the dual
system [Münch 1982; Streeck et al. 1987].
The unions argue that employers wield excessive power over the system of skill
formation because of their dominance of the regional Chambers of Industry and
Commerce that regulate and administer industrial training.  Despite this criticism, the
detailed legal descriptions of skilled occupations and apprenticeship training plans
manifest considerable union influence at the national and sectoral levels.  The unions
assert that the extensive regulation and standardization of occupations and training
protect the interests of workers by giving them access to national labor markets in
their skills, thus lessening their dependence on their current employer.  The
regulation of apprenticeship has occurred despite employers' allegations that it results
in rigidity in worker skill formation and their attempts to increase their autonomy in
designing training systems more closely aligned with the needs of their particular
enterprises.  The unions exert only an informal influence on training at the enterprise
level, but workers have some say in the implementation of in-firm training programs
through the works council (Betriebsrat), the legally mandated institutional
mechanism for worker representation at the factory level [Münch 1982; Streeck et al.
1987].
These training structures ensure that the German production worker is highly skilled,
thus permitting functions such as maintenance and quality control to be kept to a
large extent on the shop floor [Sorge and Warner 1986:124].  The German worker's
understanding of the systemic nature of production enhances his capacity for
technical problem-solving.  In addition, workers are versatile in the tasks that they
can perform, and so can be redeployed in response to day-to-day variations in
staffing requirements [Maurice et al. 1986:69].  The standard term in German
companies for this redeployment capability is Einsatzbreite, which is used both
formally and informally in evaluating individual workers for promotion [Lawrence
1980:134].
The worker's systemic perspective on production also allows him to understand how
best to reap the benefits of new technology, and in some cases his particular skills are
put to work to implement the new technology in ways that do not deskill his own
tasks [Maurice et al. 1986:70; Sorge and Maurice 1993].  A German worker's skilled
status is not inextricably tied to his current job, and German unions are organized on
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an industrial rather than a craft basis.  Technological change, therefore, does not
threaten his conditions of employment to the same extent as it does a British
craftsman, for whom the demarcation of his realm of work is a critical foundation of
his bargaining power and reward structure. Hence the virtual absence of demarcation
disputes in German companies [Lawrence 1980: 134; Sorge and Warner 1986:101,
125; Lane 1989].
The costs of the apprenticeship system are borne in part by governments at the
national and Lander levels, in part by employers through voluntary participation, and
in part by apprentices themselves in the form of low training wages [Münch 1982;
Casey 1986: 65].  One estimate suggests that West German industry made a net
annual contribution of DM25 billion to initial vocational training in the 1980s
[Financial Times, Aug. 25, 1988].  A relatively low level of worker mobility
encourages firms to make this investment in training, but their participation,
particularly that of the larger enterprises, is more plausibly explained by their
consensus on the importance of worker training to the long term viability of the
German economy.  As the head of personnel at Volkswagen put it: "Training costs
money; not to train costs a great deal more money" [Wall Street Journal, March 18,
1991].
The skill formation of German managers takes place both within and outside of the
enterprise.  German managers are notable for the high level of formal qualifications
that they hold [Lawrence 1980:76].  The vast majority of managers engaged on the
technical side of German companies have engineering qualifications.  Although less
prevalent on the commercial side, engineering nevertheless boasts a stronger
showing than any other discipline [Lawrence 1984:80; Lane 1989].  The strong
technical training of its managers, together with the close relations that many
companies maintain with universities and technical colleges (Fachhochschulen,
previously known as Ingenieurschulen), permit a partnership between science and
technology in German companies that has been one of their distinctive sources of
competitive advantage since the country's initial industrialization.  Their strong
technical backgrounds give managers a detailed knowledge of the production process
with a particular emphasis on how to build high-quality products.
The formal structures of skill formation on the commercial side of German
enterprises have historically been less well developed than those on the technical
side. German universities provide courses in business economics (Betriebs-
wirtschaftslehre), but this distinctively German approach to business education
emphasizes management operational techniques rather than management as a
discipline in its own right.  German managers have traditionally been highly
skeptical that the qualities required in top managers can be effectively taught in the
systematic manner used in American business education programs.  As a result
German post-experience management education programs have placed more
emphasis on building relationships among top managers than on academic
instruction.  Business education is also available through the vocational system in the
form of commercial apprenticeships (kaufmännische Lehre).  Like the study of
business economics, however, these apprenticeships have a strong production focus
[Lawrence 1980:65; Locke 1984, 1989; Hartmann 1959].
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The high level of formal qualifications in German companies does not reflect an
exclusive reliance on university campuses as a source of future managerial talent.
German companies do recruit for their management structures from universities, in
particular favoring those graduates with an engineering degree (Diplom Ingenieur)
[Lawrence 1980:76].  These graduates are rarely admitted to senior levels
immediately, however, and are expected first to gain experience on the factory floor
or in other operational areas [Smyser 1992:70].  Those who are recruited by the
company without a university degree can also climb up the company hierarchy, in
some cases from the shop floor to the boardroom.  At the upper management levels,
about one-quarter started their careers as workers [Maurice et al. 1986:118].
To travel this path, an aspiring manager must accumulate formal qualifications in
addition to displaying practical capability within the firm.  A network of vocational
schools facilitates access to the formal education that allows the student to build on
his basic apprenticeship training.  Before 1970 the standard route to admission to an
engineering course, at what was then the Ingenieurschule, was a three-and-a-half
year apprenticeship [Münch 1982].  The engineering qualification offered by these
schools, the Ing Grad, was thus evidence of a student's extensive academic and
practical training.  The possibility for German engineers to position themselves for
managerial careers through apprenticeship and vocational school provides an
alternative to the academic route through a university.  The Ing Grad degree has
proved very popular among German companies, and is particularly common at the
middle management level [Lawrence 1980:66; Münch 1982].
The availability of this vocational path to higher education allows German
companies to pursue a management recruitment policy that involves substantially
more upward mobility from the ranks of workers than is the case in Britain, United
States, and Japan.  The importance of additional formal education in improving
promotion prospects in German companies is manifest in the close relationship
between hierarchical position and formal qualification in German industry.  As a
result, German employees have a clear incentive to invest in their own skill-
formation process.
The ability of apprenticed workers to become engineer-managers promotes
hierarchical cooperation that has a strong technological foundation.  Many engineers,
and the Ing Grad in particular, hold the Facharbeiterbrief, and thus share a common
theoretical and practical knowledge base with the skilled worker and the foreman
(Meister).  The organizational integration of technical skills in the managerial and
blue-collar structures of German companies leads to a focus on quality in product
and process, and many German companies compete on the basis of the excellence of
their goods and services [Smyser 1992:68; Streeck 1992:34].  This common
commitment of managers and workers to the strategy of producing high-quality
products permits decentralization of operational decisions within enterprises.
This decentralization of operational decision-making contrasts with the highly
centralized nature of strategic decision making which has historically been a feature
of German companies.  The planning and allocation of resources is carried out at the
apex of German public companies in the framework of a distinctive two-tier board
structure which consists of a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and an executive board
(Vorstand).  The close relationship between hierarchical position and formal
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educational qualifications in German companies is in evidence among the strategic
decision makers on the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat, the vast majority of whom are
graduates in engineering, law and economics [Lawrence 1980].
The Aufsichtsrat is elected by the shareholders, and its consent is required for major
strategic decisions such as investments, raising capital, and mergers and acquisitions.
Its members are not full-time employees of the company concerned but tend to be
representatives of banks, customers, suppliers, major shareholders and top managers
from other companies.  The Vorstand is the main decision-making body, and its
members are professional managers who generally have been promoted up through
the company hierarchy [Lawrence 1984:36].
The growing prevalence of the salaried manager in German companies during the past
few decades and the increase in the importance of technical skills on the shop floor in
building competitive advantage has rendered functional expertise, rather than a more
general entrepreneurial capability, increasingly more important as a basis for top
managerial authority in German companies.  Although functional expertise may not be
sufficient for a candidate to be promoted to the ranks of top management, the
promotional policies of most German companies mean that functional expertise is a
necessary condition to be considered as a candidate for top management in the first
place.  What constitutes functional expertise in Germany is different than in the United
States, where expertise in general management is required to move from middle
manager to top manager.  In Germany general management is hardly even regarded as
a bona fide management function [Hartmann 1959; Lawrence 1980:94; Locke
1989:171].
5. Britain
If over the past few decades the Japanese have surpassed the United States as cost
leaders in mass markets, and Germany as quality leaders in niche markets, the
Americans and the Germans did the same to the British from the last decade of the
nineteenth century as the once-dominant British economy ceased to be the workshop
of the world.  During the last half of the twentieth century, the competitive strategy
of British industry has been to survive in a world in which its system of skill
formation is decades out of date.  Even in the most exclusive of niche markets, such
as Rolls Royce and Jaguar cars, where the British had been quality leaders, they have
become low-quality, high-cost producers relative to the Germans and now even the
Japanese.
At the level of strategic decision making, Britain’s problem in the decades after
World War II was a failure to separate equity ownership from managerial control in
major industrial corporations.  Unlike Japan, United States, and Germany, which all
experienced thoroughgoing managerial revolutions, the top managers of British
enterprises were recruited from either the families of major shareholders or elite
educational institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge with a definite bias against
technology graduates [see Lazonick 1986].
With the recruitment of top managers through these channels, British companies
neglected management development programs that, through job rotation, would
transform technical specialists into managerial generalists.  Instead, for the more
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highly trained employees, British companies relied exclusively on formal education
and on-the-job experience, with professional societies such as electrical engineers
setting standards independent of business strategy and with technical specialists
using interfirm mobility rather than intrafirm rotation as the prime means of
acquiring work experience. In comparative perspective, learning in Britain was much
more individual than organizational.  In the machine-based industries, until quite
recently, the more highly trained technical specialists (professional engineers as
distinct from operative engineers) continued to be recruited from the shop floor, with
on-the-job experience and part-time trade schools providing the means for the
professionalization of traditional shop-floor practice.
Even in the 1970s, lower-level technical specialists and middle-level managers in
British industrial enterprises were predominantly recruited from the shop floor.
Unlike the German system of skill formation, however, in which upward mobility of
apprenticed journeymen into the managerial ranks was a form of organizational
integration that ensured state-of-the-art levels of product design and performance, the
British system of skill formation ensured that traditional practices would remain
entrenched, with the strategic managers of British industrial enterprises avoiding the
massive investments in a new system of skill formation that could compete with the
more advanced systems of Germany, United States, and Japan.
The British shop-floor traditions -- what the trade unions called "custom and
practice" -- were the legacies of a skill-formation process in which narrowly defined
groups of craft workers trained new workers on the job, and used strict craft
demarcations to define their realms of work and their collective bargaining units.  It
is a system characterized by a high level of fragmentation of the division of labor
within plants and with meager corporate investments in the skills of workers.  In the
absence of a well-developed system of vocational education and enterprise
investment in training, such as exists in Germany, British workers had no choice but
to hone their skills through on-the-job experience in a narrowly defined craft.
The sharp decline of British manufacturing in the 1980s and the concomitant
"Japanization" of British industry have now made Britain’s craft system of skill
formation an endangered species.  But insofar as it exists (and the British themselves
have done little to put a new system of skill formation for industry in place), the
British system of skill formation is one which, in competition with the Japanese,
American, or German systems, can generate neither high quality products nor low
unit costs.  It is a manifestation of the failure of companies to invest in the skills of
their workforces as a basic element of competitive strategy, and the consequent
failure to develop organizational structures that can integrate the skills that do exist at
the technical or operative levels.
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The transformation of skill-formation systems
1. Historical origins and evolution
Why do different advanced industrial nations have different systems of skill
formation? This question is not just of historical interest. An analysis of how a
structure came into being provides important insights into the elements of continuity,
cumulativity, and collectivity that make that structure work, and the potential for
transforming that structure when change is required.  Specifically, when confronted
by a more powerful competitive challenge, how quickly and how effectively can a
system of skill formation be restructured?
With a growing recognition of the organizational and technological characteristics of
the Japanese challenge, Americans have been asking this question for the past decade
or so. More recently, the Germans, as well as other Europeans such as the Swedes,
French, and Italians, have begun asking this question as well.  Does the possibility of
change depend simply on the mind-set of the strategic decision makers in industry?
Or does it depend more fundamentally on transforming the relations among
participants in the specialized division of labor -- workers, managers, suppliers, and
distributors, as well as strategic decision makers?  Or does the restructuring of a
system of skill formation within industry require the transformation of national
institutions such as the systems of education, finance, and law?  These are big
questions that require big answers.  Our purpose here is to provide a historical
perspective on the dynamic evolution of systems of skill formation as an intellectual
step toward understanding how enterprises, regions, and nations can alter their
investment strategies and organizational structures to respond to shifts in competitive
advantage.
Our comparative-historical analysis of the evolution of a national system of skill
formation begins with the economic development strategy of the nation state and the
implications of this strategy for the structure of the national education system.  The
analysis then focuses on the interests of different social classes -- in particular the
managerial class and the working class -- in utilizing, augmenting, or changing the
national educational system to pursue their own skill-formation strategies.  In
comparing the current strategies and structures of skill formation, we began the
analysis with the case of Japan because of our contention that it provides the
benchmark in generating competitive advantage against which the other nations,
United States, Germany, and Britain, must be evaluated.  In providing the following
historical perspective, we summarize the experiences of these national economies in
reverse order, beginning with Britain because of its status as the nation that led the
first industrial revolution.
2. Britain
Central to the shift of industrial leadership from Britain to the United States
(particularly in consumer goods) and Germany (particularly in capital goods) from
the late nineteenth century was a movement from market coordination to managerial
coordination of economic activity [Elbaum and Lazonick 1986].  In an era of less
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complex technological development, market coordination of economic activity had
the competitive advantage of avoiding the higher fixed costs of managerial
coordination.  But through managerial coordination, the productive benefits that
could be attained from more complex technologies justified the high fixed costs --
including the costs of managerial coordination -- of developing and utilizing these
technologies [Lazonick 1991:ch.3]
The problem for Britain in the twentieth century was that the very market-
coordinated structures of industrial organization that had previously enabled its
economy to become the international industrial leader undermined the incentives and
constrained the abilities of British enterprises and industries to make the transition to
managerial coordination.  Without making such an organizational transition, the
benefits of the more advanced technologies being developed elsewhere could not be
obtained within the British economy.
The origins of the British system of skill formation are found in the ways in which
the nation came to experience the world’s first industrial revolution.  The British
mercantilist state played a critical role in fostering the first industrial revolution by
using naval power to best the Spanish in the sixteenth century, the Dutch in the
seventeenth century, and the French in the eighteenth century in a struggle for world
markets.  The success of British mercantilism in gaining access to world markets
created incentives for the British population to engage in industries that could service
these markets.  As a result, even before the industrial revolution, Britain had
experienced a substantial accumulation of industrial skills even though the British
state was not directly involved in investing in these skills [see Wilson 1965; Berg
1985].
Although enterprise management had been important to the success of the pioneering
factories in the early stages of the British (or first) industrial revolution, as the
nineteenth century progressed, firms came to rely more on the external environment
rather than internal planning and coordination to ensure access to the productive
resources required to generate (what were by the standards of the time) high quality
products at low unit costs.  The most important external resource that became
available to British manufacturing firms in the nineteenth century was an ample
supply of highly skilled and well-disciplined labor.  Senior workers -- known
collectively as "the aristocracy of labor" -- not only provided their own skills to the
building and operation of machinery but also recruited junior workers whom they
trained and supervised on the shop floor [Hobsbawm 1984; Burgess 1975; Harrison
and Zeitlin 1985; Lazonick 1990: chs.3-6].
Employers’ reliance on skilled labor to organize work and train new workers had the
advantage of low fixed costs for not only individual firms but also the British
economy as a whole.  The progress of the British industrial revolution did not rely to
any significant extent on state-supported or industry-supported education.  The
reproduction of an abundant and skilled labor force, effected as it was by worker-run,
on-the-job training, required little, if any, expense to either employers or the state
[for a case study of a leading sector, see Lazonick 1979].
In the late nineteenth century, moreover, these worker-run apprenticeship systems
yielded high levels of labor productivity.  Eager to gain entry to the aristocracy of
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labor, the promise of promotion kept younger workers hard at work.  The older
workers, generally protected by union bargains that assured them shares of
productivity gains, were themselves not averse to long and steady labor.  Skilled
workers’ intimate practical knowledge of production methods meant that, as by-
products of shop-floor experience, they were able to keep imperfect machinery
running steadily and contribute to minor technological improvements.
As older workers trained younger workers, supplies of specialized labor expanded in
certain localities during the nineteenth century.  Given an industrialist’s choice of
business (itself typically a function of his own specialized training in a particular
locality), he would tend to invest where labor with the necessary specialized skills
was in relatively abundant supply.  As a consequence, particular industries became
increasingly concentrated in particular regions of Britain during the nineteenth
century.  The regional concentration of specific British industries meant that
employers had access not only to large supplies of labor with the requisite skills but
also to communication and distribution networks that supplied a regional industry
with its basic inputs, transferred work-in-progress across the industry’s vertically
specialized productive activities, and marketed the industry’s output.
The growth of a regionally concentrated industry facilitated the vertical
specialization of constituent firms in a narrow range of activities, these firms relying
on market exchange with other firms to supply them with the necessary inputs and to
purchase their outputs for resale downstream.  The tendency toward vertical
specialization was self-reinforcing because the growing availability of suppliers and
buyers for intermediate products made it all the more easy for new firms to set up as
specialists.  Hence the growth of a regionally concentrated industry was
characterized more by the entry of new firms than by the growth of existing firms.
Vertically specialized industries became horizontally fragmented industries [for a
case study, see Lazonick 1983].
The evolution of industry structures characterized by regional concentration, vertical
specialization, and horizontal fragmentation as well as employers’ ongoing reliance
on skilled labor to organize work on the shop floor diminished the need for business
firms to invest in the development of managerial structures.  The lack of managerial
organization in turn reinforced the tendency for industrial structures to be fragmented
and specialized.  Limited in their managerial capabilities, proprietary firms tended to
confine themselves to single plant operations, thus facilitating the entry of new firms
into vertical specialties and, hence, increasing the extent of horizontal as well as
vertical fragmentation of industrial sectors.  By reducing the managerial as well as
financial resources necessary to run a business, the vertically specialized and
horizontally fragmented industry structures permitted proprietary capitalists to avoid
the separation of capital ownership from managerial control.
The prime source of the development of productive capabilities in the industrial
districts of nineteenth-century Britain was the skilled labor required to operate
technologies that, even when mechanized, were highly imperfect.  With the rise of
managerial capitalism abroad in the twentieth century, the persistence of craft-based
and market-coordinated industrial structures that had carried the British economy to
international dominance in the nineteenth century constituted impediments to the
development and utilization of advanced technology.  In the staple industries -- iron
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and steel, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, and textiles -- that had brought
Britain to economic supremacy, more organizational capability resided in craft
control on the shop floor than in the underdeveloped managerial structures [see
Lazonick 1990: ch.6]
Insofar as British craft workers continued to cooperate with their employers in the
twentieth century, it was in squeezing as much productivity as possible out of the
existing technologies, often by failing to maintain the quality of the product and
driving their shop-floor assistants as well as themselves to supply more effort.  As it
became necessary in order to retain their jobs, they also accepted lower wages.
Immobile because of their highly specialized skills, both workers and employers had
the incentives to ensure the survival of the firms through which they gained their
livelihoods.  Many British firms in the staple industries were able to survive for
decades by living off the plant, equipment, infrastructures, and skills accumulated in
the era of British industrial leadership [Elbaum and Lazonick 1986].
In some industries (mechanical engineering in particular), employers tried to use
their collective power to break craft control over the organization of work and the
determination of remuneration.  Even when employers rolled back prior union gains,
however, craft control was not eliminated, in large part because proprietary
capitalists, lacking managerial structures, had no organizational alternatives with
which to replace craft control.  What is more, even in a new machine-based industry
such as automobile manufacture, in which the craft unions were not already
ensconced, shop-floor control on the craft model became dominant in the first
decades of the twentieth century as the automobile manufacturers tended to rely on
craft workers to plan and coordinate the flow of work on the shop floor [for a
summary, see Lazonick 1990:ch.6].
Reliance on shop-floor workers to perform what we now consider to be managerial
functions continued during the interwar period, even in firms such as Austin and
Morris that were becoming dominant mass producers for the British market
[Lewchuk 1987].  In the 1940s and 1950s, under conditions of tight labor markets
combined with the limited opportunities for firms that relied on labor-intensive
technologies to generate new sources of productivity, these workers used the shop-
floor organizational responsibilities that had been delegated to them as the
foundations on which to build specialized craft unions.  The result was that by the
1960s one could find scores of separate craft agreements in place at any point in time
in any one automobile plant, with the resultant fragmentation of employer-employee
relations placing severe constraints on the managerial coordination of the specialized
division of labor within the plant.
Yet the British automobile industry remained viable in global competition until the
1960s because of its low fixed costs (including the almost complete neglect of
research and development) as well as the acceptance of relatively low returns by
workers, managers, and owners.  The 1960s and 1970s revealed, however, that like
the staple industries of the nineteenth century, the British automobile industry had
reached the technical and social limits of the utilization of its resources.  Facing the
continued development of the Continental producers as well as the rise of the
Japanese automobile manufacturers, the economic viability of the British industry
could no longer be sustained.
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The development of organizational capability was somewhat different in the science-
based industries of the second industrial revolution -- chemicals, rubber, electrical
equipment and appliances -- in which it was impossible to enter into competition on
the basis of technological capabilities inherited from the past.  Largely through the
efforts of dedicated and aggressive entrepreneurs (typically, although not always,
owners as well as managers) who either developed new technologies or controlled
foreign patents, a number of British firms such as Lever Brothers, Pilkington
Brothers, Dunlop, Courtaulds, Crosfield’s, Nobel’s, and Brunner, Mond, were able to
become strong global competitors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
[for business histories, see Wilson 1984; Barker 1977; Jones 1984; Coleman 1969;
Musson 1965; Reader 1975].
Nevertheless, after the turn of the century the largest British firms were not only
much smaller than the largest U.S. companies, but also much more under the control
of family ownership.  Our explanation for the persistence of "personal capitalism"
lies in three interrelated systemic dimensions of the social environment in which the
nation’s industrial enterprises operated: the social system, the educational system,
and the financial system [see Lazonick 1994a].
British industrialists of the late nineteenth century were generally middle class, with
their home bases in the industrial districts of the Midlands and the North.  Among
those engaged in business, large accumulations of wealth and substantial political
power were in the hands, not of these industrialists, but of financiers based in the
City of London.  Using upper-class educational institutions as means of entry and
marriages as instruments of merger, wealthy financiers joined with the old
landowning elite (many of them grown recently wealthy through rising land values)
to form a new aristocracy.  The wealth of this restructured upper class was not, as
was increasingly the case in the United States and Germany, based on the application
of science to industry and the resultant profits from technological innovation.  Rather
the bases of wealth in financial activities were social connections and acquired
reputations.  Hence the importance for ultimate economic success of family
connections and associations made at elite educational institutions -- Oxford and
Cambridge as well as public schools such as Eton and Harrow [for elaboration of
these arguments, see Lazonick 1986].
Lacking industrial roots, the aristocracy who controlled these elite institutions during
the era of the second industrial revolution had no need for an educational system that
developed technologists.  They valued the study of science as a branch of
sophisticated knowledge, but had no interest in its application to industry.  Indeed,
the British elite positively resisted the notion that a concern with technology had any
place in an aristocratic education.  They wanted education to set them apart from the
lower orders, not bring them in closer contact with them.  For, as we have already
outlined, in the rise of Britain to international industrial dominance during the first
industrial revolution, technological knowledge had generally been in the possession
of groups of workers -- the so-called "labour aristocrats" -- who gained this
knowledge through the development and utilization of machinery on the shop floor.
Nor did successful industrialists who accumulated sufficient fortunes to contemplate
joining Britain’s upper class effectively challenge the anti-industry bias of Britain’s
elite educational system.  Of middle-class, or even working-class, backgrounds,
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Britain’s most successful industrialists sought to elevate their social standing by
distancing themselves from the technological roots of their prior advance.  They
typically located their head offices in London, distant from industrial production.
They sent their sons to be educated at the elite public schools and, if possible, at
Oxbridge, to network with an aristcracy that was anti-technology.  Hence these
industrialists, and particularly the most successful among them, did not see it as in
their interests to transform the nation’s premier educational institutions into servants
of industry.  Their goal was rather to partake of aristocratic culture to serve their
aspirations for upward mobility, which meant accepting the anti-technology bias of
that culture.  As the historian Donald Coleman [1973] has put it in a well-known
essay, successful industrialists sought to become "gentlemen" rather than "players".
In seeking to move up the social hierarchy, successful industrialists did not abandon
industry for finance; barriers to entry into finance and related pursuits were high
precisely because of the centrality of social connections and reputations to the
success of the financial enterprise.  Rather, as successful British industrialists sought
to move up the social hierarchy, control over established industrial enterprises
remained the foundations of their material wealth and the most assured means of
passing wealth on to their children.  They brought their sons and sons-in-law in to
manage their businesses, thus perpetuating the integration of family ownership and
control.  The larger owner-controlled firms that, because of enterprise expansion or a
dearth of qualified family members, had to recruit top managers from outside the
family gave highest preference to young men with a classical Oxbridge education.
As a result, the most influential British industrialists put little pressure on the elite
educational institutions to offer technical and organizational training even to the
future captains of industry [see Lazonick 1986; 1991:ch.1; 1994].
By virtue of their educational backgrounds and social aspirations, those in control of
British industrial enterprises in the first half of the twentieth century were not
themselves well-equipped or well-positioned to lead their companies in the pursuit of
technological innovation.  Within the enterprise, top managers of the most successful
enterprises of the second industrial revolution set themselves apart as an elite social
class, thus creating an organizational barrier between themselves as strategic decision
makers and the technical specialists who were expected to implement enterprise
strategies.  Increasingly after the turn of the century, many of the technical specialists
employed by science-based enterprises came from the newly established provincial
universities that did try to cater to the educational needs of technologists.  The
second-class status of the graduates of the provincial universities was confirmed
when they took up employment in a major British industrial enterprise.  Because of
the way the top managers of the personally managed enterprises were recruited, these
technical specialists could not view their initial employment in even the larger
enterprises as a first step up a managerial hierarchy that might ultimately lead to a
position of control.
As a result of these barriers to social mobility within the enterprise, technical
specialists were less committed than they might otherwise have been to furthering
enterprise goals, and more likely to view interfirm mobility as the main route to
career progress.  Such prospects of employee exit in turn reduced the incentive for
the top managers of these enterprises to invest in the productive capabilities of these
technical specialists.  Even in the cases of trained scientists and engineers, therefore,
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leading British enterprises relied more on market coordination than management
coordination in their employment of labor [see Dore 1990].  In industries in which
the development and utilization of technology depended on the development and
utilization of highly specialized technical skills, enterprises that relied on market-
coordinated employment relations could find themselves at a decided disadvantage in
global competition.
3. Germany
The foundation for Germany’s world renown in the field of academic technical
education was laid in the early part of the nineteenth century.  At this time German
universities were probably as averse as their British counterparts to the establishment
of links with industry and commerce.  Noble birth had been replaced as the exclusive
standard of social prestige by formal Bildung (culture), to be acquired through a
classical education [Locke 1989:62; see also Veblen 1968:78].
State-building ambitions, particularly those of Prussia in the wake of its ignominious
defeat by Napoleon, provided the initial incentive for the promotion of technical
education.  Specifically, in its attempts to foster economic growth, the Prussian
bureaucracy identified a need for specialized occupational instruction to be provided
outside the orbit of general education.  Beginning in 1821 with the Technical
Institute in Berlin, the official in charge of technical education, Peter Beuth, laid the
basis for the marriage between science and industry when he founded a number of
technical institutes (originally Polytechnische Schulen, renamed as technische
Hochschulen) and a network of trade schools in the provinces [Gispen 1989; Konig
1993:68].
Engineering was not regarded as a legitimate academic field at this stage, and
engineers were generally restricted from the higher ranks of the civil service.  As a
result, the teachers at these technical schools were accorded a lower status than
university professors, a status which they endeavored to elevate by incorporating
more theory into their subject and by adopting the university tradition of
Wissenschaft (science) in their research.  They succeeded in creating a third science,
Technik, a unique combination of scientific knowledge and craftsmanship.  In 1900
the technische Hochschulen became the first in the world to award engineering
doctorates [Locke 1984:40; Konig 1993].
Many engineers were opposed to these developments and called for less academic
engineering education that was less academic.  They contended that an overemphasis
on theoretical knowledge in the education of engineers was undermining German
industrial performance, particularly in industries such as light machinery in which
Americans held the advantage through mass production based on interchangeable
parts [Gispen 1989].  In the 1890s the German government introduced a new type of
nonacademic engineering education which was consciously modeled on the practical
skills and shop training of American engineers (even as "shop culture" was making
way for "school culture" in the United States [Gispen 1990:105; Calvert 1967].  The
new schools, the Ingenieurschule, were designed to supplement the existing system
of higher technical institutes.  The setting up of mechanical laboratories at the longer
established schools also allowed them to become more integrated into industrial
activity [Konig 1993:78].
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A bitter battle over professional status broke out among German engineers around
the turn of the century.  This conflict between an academic group and a more
practice-oriented faction ultimately led to the concentration of power in the
engineering profession in the hands of a third group - the managerial and
entrepreneurial engineers, who had an interest in integrating theory and practice and
who had the ability to cement the links between German industry and technical
education [Gispen 1989].
The resultant relations between German industry and German institutes of higher
education were critical for the nation’s industrial development.  In contributing to
national industrial performance, it is not the formal educational system per se that is
important (as the British case shows), but how the knowledge and skills that it
generates are integrated into industrial activity.  In the industrialization of Germany,
the marriage of technical knowledge and industrial activity became the foundation
for the nation’s competitive advantage in chemicals, metals, electrical machinery, and
heavy general machinery.
Besides supporting industry’s efforts to restructure education  for technical skill
formation, the German state also played a significant role in stimulating an industrial
demand for these skills. The establishment of the Zollverein in 1834 transformed a
collection of diverse local markets into one integrated German market.  The State’s
program of economic unification, and subsequently Bismarck’s "blood and iron"
campaign for political unification, provided the requisite stimuli for investment in the
expansion of a railroad network and in the construction of a transportation and
communication infrastructure more generally [Henderson 1967:191].  The resultant
physical integration of the German states allowed entrepreneurs to reap the
economies of scale and scope they needed to justify their substantial investments in
physical and human capital [Chandler 1990:411].
The development of the German infrastructure created an unprecedented demand for
technical knowledge.  Engineers were recruited in droves not only by those
immediately involved in infrastructural construction, such as the railroad companies
and the electrical equipment manufacturers, but also by supplier industries like
metals and machine-building.  Indeed, nearly all of the German heavy machinery
enterprises initially expanded to satisfy the demands of railroads, shipbuilders, iron
producers, and mining companies [Chandler 1990:457].  The State was also an
important customer for sectors such as steel, chemicals and shipbuilding, as it built
its vast military machine before and after 1870.
Advances in technical knowledge sometimes created new investment opportunities,
with the organic chemicals industry as the clearest example of such a phenomenon.
The researchers in the laboratories of German chemical companies, universities, and
technical institutes were so central to the development of the chemicals industry that
it could be claimed that technical knowledge had founded an entire industry
[Henderson 1975:186].
Regardless of what forces prompted the initial marriage of science and industry -- an
industrial opportunity, technical knowledge, or a combination of the two -- the
mixture proved to be a potent one.  As it increasingly generated opportunities for
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growth, the initial integration of technical skills evolved into a powerful basis for
greater skill formation in the managerial structures of individual enterprises.
In the electrical industry, engineers focused on minimizing costs and ensuring
product safety in their attempts to compete with well-established alternative energy
and lighting systems in the 1860s and 1870s.  They achieved these objectives
through standardization that permitted the use of interchangeable parts to drive down
costs, and  allowed the electrical companies to maintain high standards of product
quality [Brady 1933:180].  The manufacturing and design discipline that the
electrical engineers developed during this process diffused through the German
economy because of the electrical industry’s technological linkages with many other
sectors [Brady 1933:185].
In the German machine industry, such patterns of concentration and standardization
were less prevalent.  Few companies could compete in light machinery with the
Americans who had built a competitive advantage using mass-production methods
based on interchangeable parts and high throughput to drive down unit costs.  The
markets that the Germans served gave them a different production philosophy.  They
focused on heavy machinery that was generally built to customer specifications,
often those of the government.  Their competitive advantage, therefore, depended on
their ability to acquire and develop technical skills in functional design and precision
manufacturing [Kocka 1980:104, Chandler 1990:457].
Despite differences across sectors, many German companies came to rely on
technical knowledge to achieve quality in design and manufacturing and to compete
in markets where such an emphasis could form the basis for a sustainable
competitive advantage.  In the first few years of the century, the balance of German
exports shifted from textiles and consumer goods to these technically-based
industries [Chandler 1990:410].
The institutional development of German business education mirrored that of
technical education.  The first German schools for business education, the
commercial schools (Handelhochschulen), were set up outside the university system,
as the technical institutes had been [Locke 1989:88].  The commercial schools,
however, received less state support than their technical counterparts.  Moreover,
German industrialists were skeptical about the value of this type of business
education so the close links between industry and academia that distinguished
German technical education did not develop on the commercial side [Locke 1984;
Kocka 1980:97].  The situation changed to some extent following the rationalization
of German industry after World War I that stimulated a need for commercial
training.  In responding to this demand, German business educators developed their
own distinctive field of operations-focused accounting, which they called business
economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) [Locke 1984].
The more important scientific technology became for the activities of the business
enterprise, the more likely it was that technically trained recruits would take over
managerial functions [Kocka 1980:95]. By 1900 many German companies had built
substantial hierarchies of salaried managers, a large number of whom were
engineers.  Some of these managers had even advanced to the supervisory boards of
these companies to participate in strategic decision making.  Managerial hierarchies
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were more common in Germany than in Britain at this time, but family control
remained more pervasive in German enterprises than in American ones [Chandler
1990:500].  In many well-known German cases, original entrepreneurs and their
family members who retained control of managerial hierarchies were talented
engineers in their own right.  
The role of the large German banks (Grossbanken) in financing the initial
development of the capital-intensive industries and in fostering the process of
industrial concentration that began in the 1870s has been well-documented.  The
financing role of the Grossbanken diminished after 1900 as the companies that they
served built up enough retained earnings to finance their own development [Kocka
1980:92; Chandler 1990:419].  Yet these banks maintained substantial shareholdings
in these companies, either directly through ownership positions or indirectly through
the exercise of the proxy rights attaching to shares deposited with them
(Depotstimmrecht).  Representatives of the Grossbanken generally sat on the
supervisory boards of the companies that they had financed.  Through their exercise
of the prerogatives of ownership, the banks continued to play a central financial role
by ensuring company earnings were retained for further investment rather than
withdrawn for dispersal to wealthy individuals.
In first financing and then ensuring the sustained growth of German enterprises, the
Grossbanken developed strategic decision-making capability.  Before a Grossbank
was willing to invest in a business, it generally evaluated the condition and
performance of that enterprise.  As early as the 1890s, the banks set up trustee
(Treuhand) societies to perform this task.  These organizations recruited auditors
who were trained in industrial and financial accounting and developed techniques for
analyzing the industrial operations of bank clients.  These in-house skills allowed
banks not only to understand the organizational and technological requirements of
their investments in industry but also to serve as informed and useful advisors to
many industrial companies.  Indeed, in the first decades of the twentieth century
these societies built an independent business as general consultants to German
enterprises on the basis of the skills that they had formed in analyzing the operations
of the banks’ clients [Locke 1989:232]
 In the course of its industrialization, the industries in which Germany acquired
international competitive advantage were more dependent on a distinctive national
system of managerial than shop-floor skill formation.  In some of these industries,
such as chemicals, shop-floor workers were required to have very few skills.  In
industries that did require shop-floor skills, such as the electrical and heavy
machinery sectors, employers controlled the process of skill formation for their
workers during this period in a similar manner to their American competitors.
It was only as the century unfolded that the Germans developed a unique process of
shop-floor skill formation at the national level.  The skills that this process developed
were organizationally integrated with managerial skills after World War II to form
the basis for German competitive advantage in markets where quality in product and
in process were critical, such as luxury cars, precision machine tools, and optical
equipment [Vogl 1973].
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The system of skill formation for shop-floor workers depended critically on the
transformation of the formal educational structure, and specifically the vocational
training system.  As in the case of the managerial skill formation process, the
Prussian and later the German state and the social structure played influential roles in
this development.
The German apprenticeship system has its roots in the guild system of craft
apprenticeship in the Middle Ages.  By the middle of the nineteenth century the
forces of economic liberalism had severely undermined the old corporate order.
Moreover, the repression by the Prussian state of journeyman organizations severely
weakened these institutions.  Thus, there was considerably less continuity in
Germany than in Britain between the traditional craft-based organizations of the
Handwerk sector and the trade union movement despite the fact that journeymen
were its mainstay in its early years [Kocka 1986:291].  By the end of the nineteenth
century the German labor movement was more class conscious and less craft
conscious than its British counterpart [Kocka 1986; Nolan 1986].
The trend away from craft-specific identification toward a more class-based one
became more marked as the century drew to a close because of the nature of the
industrialization process in Germany.  In many of the new industries of the second
industrial revolution that formed the core of German industrial dynamism, the
novelty and technical complexity of their processes meant that existing craft skills
could not take root on the shop floor with the same alacrity as had been the case in
industries like textiles during the first industrial revolution.
In attempting to raise their living standards, German workers, unlike the British,
relied more on their strength as a mass political movement than on the importance of
their craft skills in production.    British unions tended to exert their influence at the
level of the individual plant or enterprise and to adopt restrictive practices and block
innovation to protect their crafts.  Such practices were far less prevalent on the
German shop floor [Kocka 1986:342].  German unions relied mainly on membership
recruitment and strikes to win wage concessions from individual employers [Kendall
1975:96; Braunthal 1978:21; Nolan 1986:381].
In the early years of the new century the labor movement was confronted by the
powerful industrialists who had emerged from the process of industrial concentration
in the form of a unitary Federation of German Employers (Vereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande: VDA).  This organization was opposed to unions,
and did everything in its power to defeat organized labor [Kendall 1975:97; Nolan
1986:392]. The need to negotiate with the highly organized employers led the unions
to adopt centralized structures themselves [Braunthal 1978:21].  The unions
registered some gains in the negotiation of agreements with employers at the national
and regional levels.  In the prewar years, however, employers controlled the
workplace and dominated the process of shop-floor skill formation [Kendall
1975:98].
The apprenticeship system in Handwerk supplied many workers to the burgeoning
industrial sector but it was not specifically designed to serve the needs of industry
[Sorge and Warner 1986:185].  Thus, many of the larger employers had invested in
their own facilities and programs that modified and supplemented the traditional
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training structures at the level of the individual enterprise.  In the early decades of the
twentieth century virtually all large factories had their own apprentice school in
which workers were trained [Brady 1933:44, 187].  Concerned that this type of
vocational training would tie workers to individual companies and reduce the power
of the mass labor movement, the response of the unions was to push for training
systems that were standardized and regulated at the national or industrial level [Sorge
and Warner 1986:185].
The survival of the traditional apprenticeship structures depended on the economic
viability of the Mittelstand, the small- and medium-sized enterprises that
characterized much of the German industrial economy.  The Bismarck government
had a clear political interest in bolstering the position of this group as a buffer against
the rise of the socialist movement [Streeck 1992:112].  After the 1870s, however,
when modern industrial companies increasingly entered the traditional markets of
small artisans, the demise of traditional apprenticeship seemed imminent. The
German Reich introduced new legislation in 1897, 1900 and 1908 in an attempt to
secure the economic position of the Handwerk sector in this climate of rapid
industrialization. These acts established the basis of obligatory guilds, restored their
corporation rights, and introduced the "limited certificate of competence"
requirement for the training of apprentices [Münch 1982; McKitrick 1994:ch.6].
Although the Weimar constitution left the prewar social structure intact, working
class demands were accorded more consideration at least in the early years of the
Republic.  The Weimar period saw the continuation of the trend in union-employer
relations toward the consolidation of the power of the unions at the national and
regional levels rather than at the level of the individual enterprise or plant [Braunthal
1978:87].  In an attempt to ensure that their influence had as great an impact as
possible, and to restrict the autonomy of individual employers, the unions attempted
to formalize many elements of the employment contract [Braunthal 1978:153].  In
1925 the unions introduced occupational profiles and training plans for a variety of
apprenticeships.  The training structures in handicraft, industry, and services,
however, remained independent [Sorge and Warner 1986:185].
That the unions were more concerned with building the political basis for their power
than with preserving skills on the shop floor (as the British unions sought to do)
became particularly apparent in the Weimar period.  Since the power of labor had
been institutionalized to a considerable extent in the Weimar Republic, the unions
were confident of their ability to gain a fair share of the national wealth and were
willing to promote measures to build the competitive strength of German industry.
Thus, following a period of initial indifference to scientific management, the German
Free Unions accorded it their wholesale support in the 1920s [Guillén 1994:109].
The introduction of collective bargaining and the increased regulation of the
employment contract during the Weimar period restricted the power of the employers
to a certain degree. At the shop-floor level in 1920, moreover, the establishment of
works councils (Betriebsrate) in plants with more than 50 employees represented an
explicit attempt to give workers a voice in plant operations.  The process of
rationalization and concentration of industrial activity that took place during the
Weimar years, however, strengthened the power of industrialists and weakened that
of workers and their unions.  As employers regained their prewar strength they
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became more resistant to the demands of the workers [Braunthal 1978:175; Nolan
1986:392].
  During the Weimar period it became apparent that the Kaiserreich’s legal protection
of the Handwerk sector had not ensured its economic viability.  Throughout the
1920s the Handwerker felt threatened by dynamic industrial enterprise on the one
hand and the socialism of the working classes on the other.  They channeled their
fears and frustrations into politics, and ultimately into support of the National
Socialists.  During the Nazi period the authoritarian hand of the State intervened
once more to shape the skill formation process.  Under the Nazi regime, the
Handwerk sector was integrated into the German industrial economy in the interests
of raising the productive capabilities of the wartime economy, the training system
was standardized and regulated, and thus the foundation for the modern German
system of apprenticeship was laid [McKitrick 1994].
With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II, an
institutionalized and highly regulated system of industrial relations emerged.  A dual
system of worker representation was set up in German industry with responsibility
and authority divided between industrial trade unions and institutions of
codetermination.  In this system the unions exert a significant influence at the
industrial and regional levels through the process of collective bargaining whereas at
the level of the individual enterprise their control is only informal.  At the enterprise
level, however, workers’ representation on supervisory boards and, to a more
widespread extent, on the works councils gives workers a legal voice in company
operations.
This dual system of representation also applies to the system of worker training.
After World War II the government of the Federal Republic of Germany retained
training structures in much the same way that the Nazis had shaped them.  The
regulation and administration of apprenticeship training changed, however, to reflect
the new social order.  Trade unions were included on the vocational training
committees of chambers, and became involved with government ministries and
employers’ associations in the joint regulation which takes place in the top decision-
making bodies of the overall training system.  At the level of the enterprise, the
works councils have the right to negotiate with the individual employer about the
structure of the in-firm training program and are involved in its implementation in
the workplace.
Despite criticisms of the training system, many German companies have successfully
integrated the blue-collar skills which it has developed with the technical skills of
managers to build the postbellum success of West German industry [Münch 1982;
Financial Times, June 3, 1991].  The establishment of the German system of
apprenticeship, with its inclusion of the unions and the government as strategic
decision makers in the worker training process, reduced the autonomy that employers
had in setting a strategy and structure of worker skill formation to suit the needs of
their particular enterprises.  The apprenticeship system, however, allowed employers
to reap the benefits of the organizational learning of a collective training process that
is explicitly designed to integrate the demands of a variety of industries in its
structure. In certain industries and competitive environments, this tradeoff has been
highly attractive to employers.  In historically stable technology industries, high-
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quality worker skills can compensate for a loss in enterprise flexibility.  In industries
that involve high levels of innovation, and thus place a premium on enterprise
flexibility, the tradeoff may not be as attractive.
Worker skills have played a pivotal role in the competitive strategies of those large
West German companies that compete on the basis of quality in product and process,
and have allowed them to build a competitive advantage in markets such as luxury
automobiles, precision machine tools, and electrical machinery which qualified as
stable technology until quite recently.  Although some successful German companies
have emerged in innovative and high technology sectors such as computers,
semiconductors, and telecommunications, Germany has not secured national
competitive advantage in these industries [Katzenstein 1989:25].
The same training system has also provided the foundation for the competitive
advantage of many of the small- and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the
German Mittelstand.  Before unification, companies that employ less than 500
employees represented approximately 50 percent of West Germany’s GDP and two-
thirds of its workforce.  Mittelstand companies are responsible for the training of
most of Germany’s apprentices [The Economist Survey: West Germany, Oct. 28,
1989].  Many of these small- and medium-sized enterprises have developed strong
positions in high-quality niche markets such as precision machine tools and laser
optics through the excellence in product design and production flexibility that their
workers’ and managers’ technical skills permit [Herrigel 1989:191; Smyser 1992:68].
4. United States
Like Germany, but unlike Britain, the United States went through a managerial
revolution from the last decades of the nineteenth century [Chandler 1990].  The
emergence of a transcontinental market, linked by a transcontinental communications
system and populated by millions of independent farmers and artisans, created vast
market opportunities for enterprises that planned and coordinated the processes of
production and distribution.   To do this planning and coordinating, entrepreneurs
had to build teams of committed managers, and, particularly in the more capital-
intensive industries, those enterprises that built the most committed and skilled
managerial teams were able to capture huge market shares [Chandler 1977].
In the emergence of American managerial capitalism, the state played a major role in
subsidizing the communication system, with a particular emphasis on railroads, and
in erecting national tariffs.  Until the last decade of the nineteenth century, however,
a formal system of higher education was relatively unimportant for the preparation of
managerial personnel, in part because American industry was only beginning to
make the transition from the machine-based first industrial revolution, in which
shop-floor experience remained important, to the science-based second industrial
revolution, in which systematic formal education was a necessity.  Hence the earlier
integration of higher education into the industrial economy in Germany, where state
efforts to build the nation’s military strength stimulated growth in the new science-
based industries as well as the scientific transformation of certain sectors of the
traditional of the machine-based industries.
Skill formation in wealthy  nations: Organizational  evolution and economic consequences 29
As Alfred Chandler [1977] has shown, important early schools for late nineteenth-
century managers were the transcontinental railroads that were themselves central to
creating the national market.  Indeed, many technical specialists and managers
acquired their experience by moving from one industry to a technologically related
one [Hounshell 1984; Thomson 1989].  From the late nineteenth century, however,
the system of higher education became central to supplying technical and managerial
personnel to the burgeoning managerial bureaucracies of America’s industrial
corporations.  In Britain, as we have seen, the higher education that positioned men
for top management positions served to distance these future leaders from the
application of science to industry rather than immerse them in it.  A classical college
education, modeled on Oxbridge, had in the mid-nineteenth century also held sway
in the United States at institutions of higher learning such as Harvard and Yale.  With
the coming of managerial capitalism, however, these educational institutions were
transformed to meet the requirements of U.S. industrial enterprises for line and staff
specialists.
The pressure for educational change began to build in the mid-nineteenth century
when the advocates of Jeffersonian democracy sought to establish institutions of
higher learning that would elevate the social standing of the independent farmer and
artisan while providing them with advanced practical knowledge in agriculture and
the mechanical arts.  The ultimate legislative result of this movement was the Morrill
Land Grant College Act of 1862 that provided funding for the establishment of
agricultural and mechanical arts colleges in every state in the nation.  As it turned
out, however, individuals intent on being independent farmers or artisans had little
use for the bachelor’s degrees that the land-grant colleges offered.
But the emerging system of managerial capitalism did.  In current discussions of the
rise of U.S. managerial capitalism, a much neglected industry is agriculture.  From
the 1890s the U.S. Department of Agriculture in effect transformed the land-grant
colleges into operating divisions of a huge managerial bureaucracy.  In regional
experiment stations attuned to improving productivity of local crops, these
bureaucrats applied science to industry.  Through extension services, they sought to
diffuse the resultant technologies to the mass of farmers who, in their combined roles
as "plant" managers and "shop-floor" workers, transformed purchased inputs into
salable outputs [Ferleger and Lazonick 1993].  Also from the 1890s, U.S.
manufacturing enterprises began to take an interest in the land-grant colleges -- MIT
among them
-- as a source of supply of scientists and engineers [Noble 1977; see also Servos
1980].  For this was a time when, for the sake of developing new technologies, the
most prominent U.S. mass-production enterprises were building in-house capabilities
to apply science to industry [Reich 1985; Hounshell and Smith 1988; Mowery and
Rosenberg 1989:Part II], and for the sake of utilizing these new technologies, were
successfully eliminating craft control of production from the shop floor
[Montgomery 1987; Lazonick 1990:ch.7].
The growing importance of the land-grant colleges in American economic life in turn
put pressure on the classical colleges to make their scientific and educational
activities relevant to the needs of industry.  Especially after the turn of the century,
when (largely through philanthropic foundations established by business fortunes)
wealth accumulated in industry provided massive funding for education, managerial
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capitalism could make use of the entire system of U.S. higher education, whether
privately or publicly funded.  Industrial enterprises increasingly recruited managerial
personnel from the system of higher education, and then, through in-house training
and on-the-job experience, developed the productive capabilities of these employees
and promoted the best of them to middle-level and upper-level managerial positions.
That there was room at the top for such career managers had been ensured by the
separation of asset ownership from managerial control over the utilization of these
assets and the returns that they generated [Lazonick 1986].  As late as the 1890s in
the United States, ownership of industrial enterprises had been integrated with
managerial control.  Yet over the next generation, a separation of ownership from
control occurred in the most successful and enduring U.S. managerial enterprises.
Until the Great Merger Movement that began in the 1890s, a national market in
industrial securities did not exist in the United States [Navin and Sears 1955].  By the
1890s, however, a number of enterprises in the more capital-intensive industries had
used retained earnings to finance continuous innovation that enabled them to capture
dominant market shares.  Key to the success of these enterprises was the willingness
of owner-entrepreneurs to invest not only in production and distribution facilities but
also in managerial personnel.  These dominant enterprises were central actors in the
Great Merger Movement, and the most successful mergers occurred in the industries
of the second industrial revolution -- industries in which enterprises gained
competitive advantage through continuous product and process innovation and high-
speed utilization of production and distribution facilities [Chandler 1990:ch.3]
The Great Merger Movement did more than merely concentrate industry.  With J. P.
Morgan taking the lead, Wall Street financed the mergers by selling to the
wealthholding public the ownership stakes of the entrepreneurs whose companies
were being merged.  The ultimate result was the creation of a national market in
industrial securities.  Through the mediation of Wall Street, ownership of the assets
of the newly merged companies were transferred from the original owner-
entrepreneurs to a widely distributed population of wealthholding households.  After
the turn of the century, a company that emerged as dominant in its industry could go
public without merger, and have its shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
In taking these enterprises public, the sale of common shares did not finance new
investments in organization and technology.  Rather it financed the retirement of the
old owners from the industrial scene.  In purchasing these shares (increasingly on the
secondary market), the new owners did not assume managerial control.  What
attracted these portfolio investors to the stock market was the fact that an ownership
position in a company did not require any further commitments of time, effort, or
finance to that company.  When owners became dissatisfied with the performance of
"their" companies, they could simply sell their ownership stakes on the highly liquid
stock market to other, anonymous portfolio investors who wanted to become owners
for awhile.  Ownership had been separated from control [see Lazonick 1992].
The managers now in control were not owners but salaried employees.  Increasingly
in the first decades of this century, the salaried employees who rose to positions of
top management in U.S. science-based enterprises had been recruited to their
companies as university graduates in search of careers.  The education that they
received, moreover, provided them with the basic cognitive capabilities to apply
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science to industry -- capabilities which they improved through in-house training and
experience during the course of their careers [Lazonick 1986].
Besides permitting the separation of ownership from control, the rise of managerial
coordination in the United States had profound implications for the organization of
work on the shop floor.  Unlike Britain with its accumulations of skilled labor
supplies in industrial districts, the interregional and interoccupational mobility of
workers in the United States rendered skilled labor scarce throughout the nineteenth
century.  The alternative opportunities for self-employment as farmers and artisans
available in the United States made skilled wage labor not only expensive for
difficult to discipline.   Even in the early Lowell textile industry, when U.S.
industrialists wanted to engage in mass production, they had to look to skill-
displacing technological change to overcome the constraints on labor supply that a
highly mobile workforce imposed.  To ensure the development and utilization of the
skill-displacing technologies, U.S. industrialists had to invest in managerial
structures.  The result was the rise of a characteristic "American system of
manufactures" by the middle of the nineteenth century [Hounshell 1984; see also
Lazonick and Brush 1985].
Nevertheless, during the rapid postbellum expansion of American industry, U.S,
manufacturing enterprises, and particularly those that sought to compete on growing
national markets, found that they had to rely extensively on skilled labor to
coordinate, and even in many cases plan, production activities.  By comparison with
the persistence of craft control in Britain, however, American reliance on skilled
shop-floor labor to coordinate production activities was generally short-lived, as U.S.
industrialists developed technological and organizational alternatives to leaving
skills, and the control of work, on the shop floor.  By employing unskilled
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, by investing in deskilling
technological change, and by elaborating their managerial structures to plan and
coordinate the productive transformation, U.S. industrial capitalists attacked the craft
control that workers -- typically of British and German origin -- had staked out
during the 1870s and 1880s [Montgomery 1987].
The initial response of shop-floor workers to the exercise of managerial control was
to form craft unions.  When employers refused to bargain with these unions, shop-
floor workers turned to the restriction of output to exercise direct control over the
relation between the work effort they provided and the pay they received.  During the
first three decades of this century, employers used both political and economic power
to undermine workers’ attempts to assert shop-floor control.  They relied on
repression, instigated and financed both privately and publicly, to eliminate radical
elements in the American labor movement.  But having deprived their workers of
militant alternatives, leading industrial employers also gained the cooperation of their
shop-floor workers by sharing some of the managerial surplus with them and by
holding out (what during the 1920s at least appeared to be) plausible promises of
employment security [see Brody 1980].
The phenomenal productivity growth that U.S. manufacturing experienced in the
1920s could not have been achieved without managerial success in gaining control
over work organization on the shop floor.  At the same time, however, the decades-
long managerial offensive against craft control, combined with the evolution of a
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highly stratified educational system that effectively separated out future managers
from future workers even before they entered the workplace, left a deep social gulf
between managers and workers within U.S. industrial enterprises.  During the 1920s,
even as many dominant industrial enterprises shared some of their surpluses with
workers in the forms of higher wages and more employment security, U.S. managers,
ever fearful of a reassertion of craft control, continued with their quest to take, and
keep, skills off the shop floor [Lazonick 1990:ch.7].
The Great Depression, with its massive layoffs of blue-collar workers even by many
of the most progressive employers of the 1920s, served to deepen the social
separation of management from the shop-floor labor force.  In response, the U.S.
labor movement reorganized, but this time on an industrial rather than a craft basis,
and used the crisis of the 1930s to wring from the state a measure of economic
security for workers that private enterprise had shown itself incapable of providing.
When, in the renewed prosperity of the 1940s, dominant mass producers once again
sought to gain the cooperation of workers by offering them high wages and prospects
of secure employment, they had to deal with powerful mass-production unions.
These unions did not challenge the principle of management’s right to plan and
coordinate the shop-floor division of labor [see Lazonick 1990:ch.9].  In practice,
however, the quid pro quo for union cooperation was that seniority be a prime
criterion for promotion along well-defined lines, and ever more elaborate job
structures, thus giving older workers best access to a hierarchical succession of jobs
paying gradually rising hourly wage rates.  In return, union leadership sought to
ensure orderly collective bargaining, including the suppression of unauthorized work
stoppages.
From the 1940s to the mid-1960s, union-management cooperation in the
coordination of shop-floor relations permitted high enough levels of productivity to
sustain competitive advantage, despite the failure of the dominant mass producers to
address the issue of deskilled, monotonous, and hence alienating work.  By sharing
with blue-collar workers some of the gains that came with international dominance,
U.S. mass producers exercised a substantial degree of control over the supply of
effort on the shop floor.  But, just as the structures of cooperative labor-management
relations that served British employers well in the nineteenth century were to become
barriers to organizational transformation in the twentieth, so too would the labor-
management relations that prevailed in the U.S. era of economic dominance prove
problematic when a more powerful mode of developing and utilizing technology
came on the scene.
5. Japan
Over the past two decades, Japanese manufacturing has outperformed U.S.
manufacturing in the mass production of consumer durables, particularly
automobiles and electronic equipment.  These are the industries in which U.S.
industry had its greatest international competitive advantages in the first six decades
of this century.  Having gained competitive advantage in the consumer-durable
industries, Japanese manufacturing has also made great progress in vertically-related
capital-goods industries: machine tools, electrical machinery, and semiconductors.
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Entering the 1990s, there is no doubt that Japanese manufacturing has taken the
leading role in the microelectronics-based third industrial revolution.
As was the case historically in the United States and Germany, the Japanese state has
played an important role in protecting the home market to permit business
organizations to develop and utilize their productive resources to the point where
they could attain competitive advantage in open international competition.  But the
Japanese state has also gone further.  It has maintained a stable macroeconomic
environment, including high levels of employment and a relatively equal distribution
of income across sectors, thus enlarging the extent of the Japanese market for
manufactured goods.  It has created incentives for consumers and businesses to
purchase goods (for example, televisions and computers) that embody state-of-the-art
technologies.  It has limited the number of firms competing in major manufacturing
industries, thus creating incentives for these firms to incur the high fixed costs
necessary to attain competitive advantage.  It has promoted cooperative research and
development among major Japanese competitors.  It has ensured manufacturing
corporations access to inexpensive finance.  And the Japanese state has provided
industry with a highly educated labor force to fill blue-collar, white-collar, and
managerial positions [Johnson 1982; McCraw 1986; Anchordoguy 1989; Best
1990:chs.5-6].
The Japanese state has been able to play this role because it presides over (and is the
product of) a culturally homogenous population that, as evidenced by the Meiji
restoration and subsequent economic reforms, engaged in the process of industrial
development in a remarkably consensual manner.  The lack of prior industrial
development even in the later Tokugawa period, compared with Britain, United
States, and Germany in mid-nineteenth century, meant that the Japanese state had no
choice but to promote the education and enterprise that would generate a broad-based
system of skill formation.
Although, in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese state consciously pursued an
economic development strategy, it relied on private-sector enterprises to formulate
the investment strategies and implement the organizational structures that would
generate innovation and growth.  The State did, however, make critical investments
in the educational system, so that within two decades after the Meiji Restoration, the
Japanese system of public education was virtually universal and the system of higher
education was turning out a steady supply of engineers who then acquired specialist
skills working for private-sector companies that were building managerial structures
[see Odagiri and Goto 1993].
A fundamental institution of Japanese capitalism is the enterprise group, or keiretsu.
The original enterprise groups in modern Japan were the family-controlled zaibatsu
that led the development of heavy industry -- particularly iron and steel and
shipbuilding -- from the turn of the century until World War II.   Some of the most
important zaibatsu originated through the efforts of political-entrepreneurs, who used
their connections to the Meiji government, that was bent on fostering industrial
development, to gain privileged access to resources and rights (such as minerals and
transportation) that were crucial to Japan’s development strategy.  To make good on
their leading roles in Japanese economic development, the zaibatsu families
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delegated substantial decision-making power to professional managers who used this
power to build formidable managerial structures [Morikawa 1992].
In the aftermath of World War II, the Allied occupation forced the dissolution of the
zaibatsu by implementing the widespread distribution of equity shares, while leaving
the constituent enterprise groups intact. In the 1950s, the Japanese business
community undertook a "cross-shareholding movement" to ensure that ownership
rights in companies would reside with other industrial and financial companies, that
would act as "stable shareholders", seeking neither high yields nor capital gains on
their equity positions.  Rather, cross-shareholders hold the shares for the sake of
ensuring reinvestment in industry in general, which over the long rung generates
more business for the companies in the activities in which their competitive
advantages lie [Ballon and Tomita 1988; Gerlach 1992; Miyajima 1994].
Since World War II, the largest of these corporate entities -- Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and
Sumitomo -- shorn of family control, have remained powerful corporate actors in the
Japanese economy, along with a few other large groups built up either by powerful
banks or by industrial enterprises that have emerged as dominant in their industries.
In the automobile and electronics industries, for example, Toyota and Sony have
spawned vertical keiretsu through which they plan and coordinate of group activities,
including the creation or acquisition of new vertically related enterprises as the need
arises.  Enterprise groups permit the core companies to enjoy the advantages that the
vertical integration of production and distribution creates for the borrowing of
technology and the implementation of process and product innovation, without
enduring the disadvantages of unmanageable bureaucracies that stifle technological
and organizational change.  By circumventing the intrafirm organizational structure
through subcontracting arrangements with satellite firms, the core company can
pursue new investment strategies that require entrepreneurial initiative and leaps in
technological ability.
The growth of enterprise groups provides core companies with the opportunity for
strategically locating more labor-intensive activities in smaller firms in which the
technical specialists have direct proprietary interests in enterprise performance, and
in which control of the terms of employment and work conditions need not be shared
with the enterprise unions that have become central to labor-management relation in
the dominant companies.  Although as subcontractors for the core enterprises, the
satellite firms can in principle act independently, in practice the very success of the
innovative strategies of the dominant enterprises and their commitment to
maintaining long-term relations with their subcontractors leads the smaller firms to
view themselves as members of an integrated organizational structure [Dore 1986;
Best 1990: ch.5; Smitka 1992].
Over time, some of these "satellites", if successful, have taken on lives of their own,
as in the case of Fanuc, the company set up by Fujitsu to develop numerical control
units for machine tools [Collis 1988].  Even then, the very fact that one strong
vertically related enterprise has emerged out of the development of another creates a
continuing basis for cooperative investment policies while each builds its own
internal organization.  The organizational capability developed through intercompany
cooperation within groups undoubtedly enhances the ability of firms from different
groups to engage in cooperative research and development projects, as has been the
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case in the emergence of an internationally competitive Japanese computer industry
[Anchordoguy 1989].
The ability to organize cooperative investment strategies across enterprises is
enhanced by the structure of managerial decision-making within enterprises.
Consensus decision-making -- the ringi system -- emphasizes the two-way flow of
ideas and information up and down the corporate hierarchy.  Consensus decision-
making grew out of the need of the rapidly growing zaibatsu of the early twentieth
century to lure college graduates -- products of a concerted effort by the state to
create on educated elite -- away from prestigious government posts.  Considerable
technical information was required from, and considerable authority had to be
delegated to, these professional managers.  Even in the cotton textile industry, which
in Japan as in Britain and United States played a major role in early industrialization,
the recruitment of college graduates to serve as mechanical engineers was central to
the achievement of high levels of productivity on the basis of inexpensive cotton and
unskilled labor [Yonekawa 1984; Morikawa 1989; Mass and Lazonick 1990;
Lazonick and Mass 1994].
The institutional basis for the devolution of decision-making power from chief
executives to a wider group that extends further down the formal hierarchy is
permanent, or lifetime, employment.  Japanese managers typically rise out of the
ranks of "white-collar workers" who enter the firm after graduating from college.
Like consensus decision-making, the policy of permanent employment was extended
to professional managerial personnel in the early twentieth century in order to attract
them away from government service and to create the long-term attachments that
would make it worthwhile for the business enterprises to invest further in the training
of the recruits [Daito 1986].
Over time, however, the offer of permanent employment has been extended further
down the organizational hierarchy.  Before World War II permanent employment
was used as a strategy to transform "key" skilled workers (oyakata) who, as highly
mobile labor contractors, had recruited, trained, and supervised shop-floor labor, into
permanently employed foremen who now performed the same functions, but with a
long-term commitment to one particular company [Okayama 1983; Gordon 1985].
In the early 1950s a strategy of substituting cooperative enterprise unions for the
militant industrial unions that had arisen after World War II resulted in the extension
of permanent employment status to all male blue-collar workers in the larger
enterprises [Cusumano 1985:ch. 3].
The recent success of Japanese mass producers in introducing flexible manufacturing
systems owes much to the fact that, for decades before the introduction of the new
automated technologies, blue-collar workers were granted considerable discretion to
monitor and adjust the flow and quality of work on the shop floor [Cusumano
1985:ch.5-6].  Moreover, the ability of Japanese managers to develop the skills of
blue-collar workers owes much to the existence for over a century of a national
system of mass education designed specifically to ensure that the workforces of the
future will possess the general cognitive competence that advanced production
technology requires [Odagiri and Goto 1993; Dore and Sako 1989].
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Japanese practice is in marked contrast to the U.S. managerial concern with using
technology to take skills and initiative off the shop floor, a practice that goes back to
the late nineteenth century when the success of U.S. mass production was dependent
upon breaking the power of craft workers and transferring to management the sole
right to plan and coordinate the flow of work.  Despite the existence of militant
unionism in Japan at various points in the first half of the twentieth century, there
was never any attempt by Japanese workers or their organizations to establish craft
control on the shop floor [Gordon 1985: Part 1].  As a result, Japanese employers
never had to confront established craft positions of workers as was the case with U.S.
manufacturers around the turn of the century, nor did they have to resign themselves
to simply leaving skills on the shop floor in the hands of autonomous craftsmen as
was the case in Britain.
Historically, the problem facing Japanese employers was not to rid themselves of
skilled workers who might use their scarce skills to establish craft autonomy on the
shop floor.  Rather their problem coming into the twentieth century was the absence
of a self-generating supply of workers with industrial skills.  To overcome this
constraint, industrial employers had to make the investments that would transform
unskilled workers into skilled workers and then retain them by integrating them into
the organization.  To be sure, these same employers generally only accepted the
institutionalization of permanent employment, enforced by enterprise unions, when
compelled to do so by the threat of militant unionism after World War II.  In
practice, however, out of the exigencies of developing and utilizing workers with
industrial skills, the social foundations for the current permanent employment system
were laid in Japan decades before the long-term commitment of the enterprise to the
blue-collar worker became an institutional feature of Japanese industry.
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Skill formation and competitive advantage
In terms of the organizational integration of management and labor, the Japanese
system of skill formation is most similar to that of Germany.  In both nations, skill
formation on the shop floor is integral to the strategy and structure of skill formation
in the enterprise as a whole.  In Germany, however, the skill-formation structure of
the enterprise derives from an industry-wide strategy to set high-quality product
standards, whereas in Japan the skill-formation structure derives from an enterprise
strategy to engage in continuous problem-solving to cut costs.  In Germany shop-
floor workers are trained to perform to precise occupational standards, whereas in
Japan shop-floor workers are trained to perform many tasks that will enable them to
recognize and confront production problems as they arise.  In historical perspective,
the German system of skill formation reflects a tradition of producing for markets
that demand high quality, whereas the Japanese system reflects a tradition of
producing for markets that demand low cost.
The German and Japanese systems of skill formation also differ in the ways in which
they are shaped by and diffuse to large and small manufacturing companies.  In
Japan, large and small companies tend to be vertically linked through enterprise
groups, with the strategy for skill formation issuing from the dominant enterprise but
extending to smaller subcontracting firms.  In Germany, the industry-wide, and even
nation-wide, character of the strategy and structure of skill formation means that the
system extends to both large and small companies, whether they are vertically linked
or not.  Notwithstanding regional variations within Germany, the German system of
skill formation appears to be driven as much by the needs of the Mittelstand as by
those of major industrial corporations such as Siemens, BMW, and BASF.
 Although shaped by different product-market orientations, by making skill
formation on the shop floor central to their investment strategies, both the German
and Japanese systems differ markedly from the American system.  In the American
case, the shop-floor investment strategy has been to substitute machines and
materials for the skills of workers.  What all three systems -- the German, Japanese,
and American
-- have in common, however, is investment in managerial structure as the historical
precondition for the shop-floor investment strategy, whether it be skill-creating as in
Germany and Japan or skill-destroying as in the United States.  And all three systems
differ from the British case in having a strategy and structure of skill formation at the
managerial level.
What are the implications of these different systems of skill formation for changes in
international competitive advantage?  In the post-World War II decades, Japanese
enterprises gained competitive advantage over American enterprises in those
industries such as steel, consumer electronics, and automobiles in which an
integrated system of skill formation within the managerial structure was critical for
product innovation, but also in which the evolution of process technology made an
integrated system of skill formation that included shop-floor workers and suppliers
was critically important for process innovation.  In industries in which, from the
1960s, a system of skill formation that focused on the managerial structure alone
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continued to suffice in global competition -- industries such as pharmaceuticals and
chemicals -- the Americans continued to be leading innovators, and Japanese
companies were unable to mount an effective competitive challenge [for an
elaboration of this argument, see Lazonick and West 1994 forthcoming].
Indeed, in industries such as pharmaceutical and chemicals, the system of skill
formation that generates organizational learning and innovation includes tight
research and development linkages with universities, a set of relationships that has
long prevailed in Germany and United States, but not in Japan.  In Germany, these
industry-university linkages are part of a national system of skill formation designed
to generate high-quality products without the achievement of low unit costs being a
primary concern.  In machine-based industries, however, where process innovation
has been important in driving down costs, the Japanese have been able to use their
highly integrated systems of skill formation to generate the organizational learning
that has permitted them over time to move into high-quality market segments at
lower unit costs than their high-quality competitors.  Some two decades ago, the
Japanese used their process innovations to displace Germans in the high-quality
camera and binocular markets.  Today, Japanese companies are mounting the same
effective competitive challenges to Germany in the machine tool and luxury
automobile markets.
 Considering the four national economies in terms of both quality and cost (and with
obvious oversimplification), Britain can now be characterized as a low-quality, high-
cost producer, United States as a low-quality, low-cost producer, Germany as a high-
quality, high-cost producer, and Japan as a high-quality, low-cost producer.  In both
Britain and the United States, the dominant response to the Japanese challenge has
been to seek to remain competitive by restraining wage increases and increasing
labor effort (in large part as a concomitant to downsizing), with a neglect of
investments in skill formation that are essential for raising living standards and
improving employment conditions over the long term.  As the Japanese challenge has
begun to make itself felt in Germany (as well as in other economies of continental
Europe), similar adverse pressures on wages, effort, and investments in skill
formation are becoming manifest.
The British and American experiences have shown that, in response to the pressures
of global competition, strategic decision makers have a tendency to turn from making
value-creating investments in skill formation that can generate higher quality, lower
cost products in the future to implementing value-extracting strategies that permit
those who control resources to live off the value-creating investments made in the
past [see Lazonick 1994b].  Financial interests exert much more pressure on British
and American strategic decision makers in industry to treat the process of skill
formation not as a productive investment that can generate returns in the future but as
an operating expense that depresses returns in the present.
The power of financial interests to stress short-term profits as the goal of the firm has
confronted the power of managerial interests to invest in, and restructure, skill-
formation systems when the systems that previously generated sustained competitive
advantage in the past have ceased to do so.  An understanding of the importance of
the process of skill formation to economic development and international
competitive advantage raises critical questions about the valuation of human-capital
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investments in capitalist economies, who has an interest in making these investments,
and in whom these investments are made.  Especially when, as is the case in Britain
and United States, and increasingly in Germany, existing systems of skill formation
are under intense competitive pressure, policies for industrial restructuring must
consider the modes of corporate governance (and underlying changes in political
alignments) that are required to put new, more innovative, systems of skill formation
in place.
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67(3JUXSSHQ EOH HWDEOHUW L  IRU n IRUV\QH
EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUH PHG IRUVNQLQJ NQ\WWHW WLO DOOH
VLGHU YHG LQQRYDVMRQ RJ WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ PHG
V UOLJ YHNW Sn IRUKROGHW PHOORP LQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVN YHNVW RJ GH VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU %DVLV IRU JUXSSHQV DUEHLG HU
HUNMHQQHOVHQ DY DW XWYLNOLQJHQ LQQHQ YLWHQVNDS RJ
WHNQRORJLHU IXQGDPHQWDO IRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnU OLNHYHO PDQJH XO¡VWH SUREOHPHU RPNULQJ
KYRUGDQ SURVHVVHQ PHG YLWHQVNDSHOLJ RJ
WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ IRUO¡SHU RJ KYRUGDQ GHQQH
SURVHVVHQ InU VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH RJ ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJV WHNQRORJL RJ LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQ L 67(3JUXSSHQ HU GHUIRU VHQWUHUW
RPNULQJ KLVWRULVNH ¡NRQRPLVNH VRVLRORJLVNH RJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNH VS¡UVPnO VRP HU UHOHYDQWH IRU GH
EUHGH IHOWHQH LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNN RJ ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW
7KH67(3JURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWRVXSSRUW
SROLF\PDNHUV ZLWK UHVHDUFK RQ DOO DVSHFWV RI
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ LQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDO FRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\ DQG LQQRYDWLRQ DUH IXQGDPHQWDO WR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\ KDYH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF LPSDFWV 5HVROYLQJ
VXFK SUREOHPV LV FHQWUDO WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ DQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI VFLHQFH WHFKQRORJ\ DQG
LQQRYDWLRQ SROLF\ 7KH UHVHDUFK RI WKH 67(3 JURXS
FHQWUHV RQ KLVWRULFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LVVXHV UHOHYDQW IRU EURDG ILHOGV RI
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
